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T
he number of workers with a 401(k) plan
grew from 7.1 million in 1983 to 38.9 million
by 1993. The rapid diffusion of this new type
of pension plan underscores a broader change in
pension structure. Your father’s pension plan was
designed to give him a fixed income after retire-
ment, but only if he stayed with his employer for
20 or 30 years; if he left early, he ended up with
little or nothing. In contrast, your 401(k) or thrift
plan is portable; the money accumulated in the
account belongs to you when you leave your job,
perhaps after a vesting period of a year or two.
Consequently, the rise in 401(k) plans may have
important implications for job tenure and worker
mobility.
Your father’s pension plan is called a defined
benefit pension because the benefit—the money
paid out of the pension—is set in advance by a for-
mula that depends on salary and tenure. Employers
fund defined benefit pensions by saving money
over time, but the amount that they save does not
determine the benefit that is paid out. The 401(k)
and thrift plans that have become more common
today are examples of defined contribution pensions.
In these plans, the contribution—the money going
into the pension—is set in advance, while the final
value of the pension is uncertain and depends on the
rate of return earned by accumulated contributions.
Pensions can be quite valuable, often worth
$200,000 or more in present value at retirement
for a worker who has stayed long enough with an
employer. Moreover, different types of pensions can
have important effects on job mobility, retirement,
and saving decisions of workers.
TRENDS IN PENSION COVERAGE
Over the last 20 years, defined contribution (DC)
plans have supplanted defined benefit (DB) plans
as the typical pension for many workers. Figures 1
through 3 highlight trends in pension coverage from
1983 through 1998.1 Figure 1 shows that overall
pension coverage declined from 67 percent of full-
time employees in 1983 to 58 percent in 1998; it
also shows trends in the percentage of full-time
workers with a DB or DC plan. Figures 2 and 3 show
the distribution of workers across pension type in
1983 and in 1998. In 1983, 40 percent of workers
with a pension had only a DB plan, while 45 percent
had both a DB and DC plan and only 15 percent had
a DC plan. Figure 3 shows the dramatic decline in
DB pension coverage: 20 percent had only a DB plan
and 20 percent had both types, while 59 percent had
only a DC plan.
In the rest of this article, we will describe how DB
and DC pensions affect incentives of workers and
employers. First, we discuss how pensions work
and why they exist. Next, we describe the differ-
ences between DB and DC pensions, which are
also enumerated in Table 1, and we analyze the
impact of these differences on workers’ incentives
to stay in a job. Because of these incentive effects,
the switch from DB to DC pensions may alter job
tenure, worker mobility, and retirement patterns.
Later, we discuss other differences between DB and
DC pensions in administrative control and in the
distribution of interest rate risk and other risks.
These differences may influence saving behavior,
stock market participation, and post-retirement
consumption patterns.
HOW DO PENSIONS WORK?
The Structure of DB Pensions
A worker who qualifies for a DB pension will
get an income flow until his death. The annual bene-
fit is typically a proportion of either the worker’s
1 Pension statistics are reported by individuals in the Survey of Consumer
Finances, which is computed for employees working 35 or more hours
per week and weighted so that they are nationally representative. The
SCF took place every three years from 1983 on, but the questions in
1986 were not asked in the same way, and the 1986 sample is not
nationally representative.
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NOTE: Includes only those individuals that specified pension
type.








1998 Pension Structure for U.S. Labor Force
Full-Time Employees
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average or final salary, with the proportion increas-
ing with tenure. We can summarize the flow in
present value terms: Pension wealth Pt is defined
as the real present value of the worker’s expected
future pension benefits, actuarially discounted to
incorporate uncertainty over the lifespan, if the
job ends at time t. Pension wealth accrual is the
change in pension wealth, 
,
discounted at rate 0<δ<1 if the employee works
one additional year and then leaves.
The path of DB pension wealth accrual is charac-
terized by occasional sharp spikes. Figure 4 shows
pension wealth accrual in a typical DB pension plan.2
The first spike, in this case worth about $60,000,
occurs when the worker vests, that is, becomes eli-
gible for future benefits. Maximum vesting dates
of 10 to 15 years were established in 1974 and have
since been lowered to 5 to 7 years. While vesting
yields a claim to some future benefits, pension
wealth continues to rise as the worker gains tenure.
Another spike, worth over $100,000, occurs
when the worker reaches the plan’s early retirement






years on the job. At the ERD a retiree can first begin
to receive cash benefits. The early benefit is gener-
ally smaller than the full benefit available at the
normal retirement date (NRD); if it is significantly
smaller, then another spike in pension wealth occurs
at the NRD. Frequently, though, the penalty for retir-
ing early is small, as is the case in Figure 4. After
the ERD or NRD, pension accruals swing around
and turn negative because the worker gets little or
no further increase in the benefit level but forgoes
income by not retiring.
The Structure of DC Pensions
DC pensions are very simple: Funds go into an
account, the worker can choose among a limited
number of investment options, and the pension is
portable after vesting. Therefore, workers can take
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2002      25
2 These pension plans are based on information in the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS) and have been slightly altered, as described
in Friedberg and Webb (2000), to protect confidentiality. The HRS is
a nationally representative study of households with at least one mem-
ber aged 50 to 62 in 1992. The HRS obtained detailed information
about pension plans directly from employers of survey respondents.
Earlier DB plans were similar or had even sharper spikes; these patterns
were documented in a series of papers by Kotlikoff and Wise (1985,
1987, 1989) and Stock and Wise (1990a, 1990b).
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their accumulated funds with them when they leave
their job. DC pension wealth after vesting is simply 
(1) ,
where rt is the rate of return earned on assets accu-
mulated through the previous period and ct is this
period’s contribution. Most DC pensions have vest-
ing periods that are either immediate or less than
two years.3 Contributions are tax-deductible (as are
a firm’s contributions to fund a DB pension), and
returns accumulate tax-free. Withdrawals from DC
pensions, like DB pension benefits, are taxable.
The smooth path of DC pension wealth accrual
shown in Figure 4 stands in stark contrast to the path
of DB accrual. These differences directly affect incen-
tives to stay in a job. DC pension accruals are largely
age-neutral. Compared with a portable DC plan, a
DB plan tends to reduce worker mobility for many
years after a worker starts a job. Later on, it encour-
ages retirement when pension accruals turn nega-
tive, whereas DC pension accruals remain positive
and steady.
While the expected rate of return on DC pen-
sion wealth in Figure 4 is assumed to be constant,
unpredictable changes in the actual return will
shift the realized path of pension wealth accrual.
For example, the sharp downturn in the financial
markets in 2000-01 has reduced the value of DC
pensions invested in stocks.4 This interest rate risk
introduces a new element of uncertainty as workers
plan for retirement, so the widespread adoption of
DC pensions may increase the volatility of retire-
ment rates.
WHY DO PENSIONS EXIST?
Why is part of compensation deferred in the
form of a pension? Individuals should prefer cash
up front, if all else is equal; pensions exist because
all else is not equal. The current theory of pensions
was developed in a series of papers summarized in
Lazear (1986), when DB pensions were the norm.
In Lazear’s view, DB pensions alter the incentives
for long-term employment. We extend the theory
to explain the choice between DB and DC pensions.
DC pensions do not offer the same incentives for
long-term employment, so they must serve an
additional purpose perhaps by encouraging long-
term saving. Thus, we focus on the incentives for
long-term employment and for long-term saving.
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A Stylized View of Pensions
A simplified version of DB pension wealth takes
the following form:
(2) .
A worker gets a fixed payment P – if she stays in the
job until some future date T.5 DB pensions impose
a risk on workers—that their job could end before
time T and they would then lose their pension. Port-
able DC pensions do not impose this severance risk,
so DB pensions must be more valuable, at least in
expectation, for risk-averse workers to accept them.
Thus, P – can be written as
(3) ,
where PT
DC is the value of a DC pension at the same
future period T, E0[.] denotes the expectation at the
outset of employment, and π>0 is a premium asso-
ciated with an enduring employment relationship,
explained later. 
Workers will only accept a DB pension if
expected tenure, as well as the DB premium π, are
high, relative to the interest rate risk implicit in DC
plans. Some evidence on the size of this premium
is available from the Health and Retirement Study,
a longitudinal survey with detailed pension data
for people aged 50 to 62 in 1992. We can use this
information to compare DB and DC pension wealth
if a worker retires at age 65. As defined earlier and
detailed in Friedberg and Webb (2000), DB pension
wealth is the present actuarially discounted value
of expected future benefits (assuming a 3 percent
discount rate and age- and gender-specific survival
probabilities), and DC pension wealth is the esti-
mated plan balance. For full-time employees in
1992, median pension wealth was $192,006 for
workers with a DB plan and $99,105 for workers
with a DC plan. Future workers will have somewhat
higher DC pension wealth, as they spend more time
in jobs with DC plans. Still, this gives an idea about
the relative value of typical DB and DC pensions.
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3 From 30 to 35 percent of DC plans vest immediately and another 20
percent vest in two years or less, while most DB pensions take five
years to vest, according to Mitchell (1999). 
4 See, for example, Crary (2001).
5 In fact, before 1974, many DB pensions vested only at the NRD,
according to Ippolito (1988).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS Friedberg and Owyang
The Value of Long-Term Employment
Lazear viewed pensions as a component of an
implicit contract. Employers avoid explicit long-term
contracts in order to preserve their flexibility, but
they may nonetheless wish to encourage workers
to stay or to devote greater effort to their job. Several
possible explanations lie behind the “implicit con-
tract” theory of pensions.
One reason an employer might encourage
longer tenure is linked to the cost of searching for
new workers. If searching for a new hire is costly,
the decision of whether to search depends on a
worker’s expected tenure. Also, the relative ease or
difficulty of transferring human capital investments
can affect the firm’s desire to have longer tenured
workers. If human capital investments do not easily
transfer to other workers or to other jobs, the sooner
a worker is expected to leave, the more reluctant the
employer will be to train that worker. The expecta-
tion of longer tenure then raises the rate of job train-
ing and results in higher productivity and profits,
which the employer can share with the worker in
the form of a DB pension. 
Alternatively, in an efficiency wage framework,
deferred compensation encourages workers to
devote greater effort to their jobs. In some jobs it is
difficult or costly for employers to monitor workers,
who may shirk their responsibilities. Employers may
find it useful in such cases to pay an “efficiency
wage,” which is higher than the prevailing wage in
other jobs. This policy deters shirking, since a worker
will lose her high-wage job if shirking is detected.
Deferred compensation, in the form of a pension
for instance, can also function as an efficiency wage,
since a worker who shirks may lose her job before
qualifying for that pension. 
Pensions and the Incentive to Retire
The most common form of deferred compensa-
tion is the implicit promise of future wage increases,
which also encourages longer tenure. If a fixed
amount of wages are to be paid over some duration,
wages can be structured to rise over time by paying
a worker less than her marginal product early on
and more than her marginal product later. 
However, two problems arise with this element
of an implicit long-term contract. First, it encourages
workers to stay on too long. An aging worker will
choose to retire when her marginal utility of leisure,
which probably increases with age, exceeds her
wage; the rising wage profile therefore leads her to
retire later than the efficient date. Second, the rising
wage profile creates an incentive for employers to
violate the implicit long-term contract by firing
workers, since employers will receive the benefits
of the increased productivity sooner than workers.
This credibility problem undermines the implicit
contract; workers will not agree to a rising wage
profile if they anticipate getting fired when their
wages rise.
DB pensions help resolve both of these prob-
lems. A DB pension encourages the worker to retire
at the “right” age, since the real value of her pension
accruals turns negative after a certain point. And
that condition, in turn, reduces the incentive of
employers to fire older workers, which helps main-
tain the credibility necessary for the implicit con-
tract. Again in this case, the employer may wish to
fire a worker before the major spikes in pension
wealth accrual. But, as argued above, that under-
mines the implicit long-term contract that promised
workers a pay-off for long tenure. Furthermore, age
discrimination laws and union rules make it difficult
to fire older workers systematically. 
Evidence for the “Implicit Contract”
Theory of Pensions
Several pieces of evidence support the notion
that DB pensions function as an implicit contract.
For example, workers in jobs with DB pensions are
less likely to leave their job. Among workers aged
30 to 54 in the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances,
those with a DB pension had average tenure of 12.5
years, compared with 10.1 for workers with a DC
pension. The difference of 24 percent is statistically
significant.
In addition, pensions are correlated with the
timing of retirement. Using detailed data from both
particular firms and national surveys, previous
researchers have shown that workers tend to delay
retirement until they reach the major spikes in DB
pension wealth accrual at the early and normal
retirement dates. The evidence suggests that DB
pensions affect the timing of retirement by as much
or more than Social Security (Stock and Wise, 1990a,
1990b; Samwick, 1998). The spread of DB pensions
in the 1950s and 1960s coincided with a substantial
decline in the average retirement age (Lumsdaine
and Wise 1994). The median retirement age is now
age 62, so a significant fraction of workers retire
before they are even eligible to receive Social Security
benefits. Much of this early retirement may be
attributable to DB pensions.
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Summary of Pension Characteristics
Defined benefit Defined contribution
Key pension characteristics
Determined in advance Pension benefit Pension contribution
Encourages longer tenure Yes No
Encourages optimal retirement Yes No
Encourages long-term saving Yes Yes
Contributions are tax-deferred Yes Yes
Differences during employment
Pension design
Median vesting period 5 years 0-2 years
Timing of pension wealth accruals Most of pension wealth  Smooth accrual
accrues late in career
Portable No Yes
Administrative control
Controls investment of assets Firm Worker, firm*
Can borrow against assets† — Worker
Bears costs of administration Firm Worker, firm
Bears costs of regulatory compliance Firm Firm
Risk
Interest rate risk Firm Worker
Underfunding risk —† Worker‡
Risk of early severance Worker —
Differences after employment
Pension design
Form of pension benefit Annuity Lump sum
Bequeathable No§ Yes¶
Administrative control
Controls investment of assets Firm Worker
Bears costs of administration Firm Worker
Bears costs of regulatory compliance Firm Worker#
Risk
Interest rate risk Firm Worker
Lifespan risk Firm Worker
NOTE: *Employers choose which investment options to offer, usually including investment in company stock and several different
mutual funds.
†Government regulations constrain both underfunding and overfunding of DB pensions by firms.
‡Contributions to 401(k) plans are voluntary and hence are subject to underfunding risk, but contributions to other types of DC plans
are mandatory. Workers can withdraw DC assets in case of financial hardship or when separated from the firm; if they do so before
age 59 1/2, they owe a 10 percent penalty to the government. Some firms allow 50 percent of worker contributions to the 401(k) (up
to $50,000) to be used as collateral for loans with a term of no more than 5 to 10 years.
§Many DB pensions allow retirees a choice between a larger annual benefit payable until the retiree dies, or a smaller annual benefit
payable until both the retiree and his or her spouse die.
¶Individuals are required to make regular withdrawals of assets from their DC plans beginning at age 70. If they do not, they or their
heirs face tax penalties, limiting the extent to which DC assets can be saved for a bequest.
#As mentioned previously, individuals owe penalties for withdrawing funds when too young or too old.
Table 1In a similar vein, recent research by Friedberg
and Webb (2000) shows that workers with DC plans
are retiring later than workers with DB plans because
of the differences in pension wealth accrual. The
resulting change in the average retirement age is
almost two years, controlling for other factors. 
Other pieces of evidence are also consistent
with the implicit contract theory of pensions. For
example, DB pension coverage is more common in
industries with high rates of job training. Recall
that one reason for employers to encourage longer
tenure is to gain more rewards from training their
employees. Data on job training rates, aggregated
for seven broad industrial sectors, can be matched
to pension coverage rates in the 1992 Survey of
Consumer Finances.6 Regression results in Table 2
suggest a link. Industries with high training rates
have more pension coverage; a 10 percent higher
training rate is associated with an 11.7 percent
higher pension coverage rate. Moreover, industries
with high training rates also have significantly more
DB and less DC coverage. A 10 percent higher train-
ing rate is associated with 7.9 percent higher DB
coverage and 5.6 percent lower DC coverage, among
those with pensions. 
Most of the evidence which we have discussed
here involves correlations between pension coverage
and other variables (tenure, retirement, job training).
The correlations do not prove causation, however.
DB pensions might cause workers to stay in a job
longer when young and retire early when old, for
example; or employers might offer DB pensions to
attract workers who want to do those things, along
the lines suggested in the sorting model of Salop and
Salop (1976). In either case, though, DB pensions
help employers achieve the desired length of tenure. 
Pensions and Personal Saving
The discussion above explains the purpose of
DB pensions, but not necessarily DC pensions,
which have little effect on tenure. Besides function-
ing as an implicit contract, deferred compensation
obviously alters the path of consumption and saving
for workers who face borrowing constraints. This
should make pensions less appealing, according to
conventional economic theory. However, recent
research based on psychological evidence suggests
that pensions may help workers save for retirement. 
This notion is implicitly tested in most of the
existing research on 401(k) plans, which seeks to
determine whether people who save in 401(k) plans
save more altogether. Conventional theory suggests
a small positive response is likely, and a negative
response is possible, because people would shuffle
their assets and thereby gain a tax break that reduces
their need to save. However, comparisons between
people whose employers offer 401(k) plans and
people whose employers do not suggests that 401(k)
eligibility leads to substantial increases in saving.7
The magnitude of this response is difficult to
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6 The January 1991 Current Population Survey asked respondents,
“Since you obtained your present job, did you take any training to
improve your skills?” More information about these data is reported
in the notes for Table 2. 
7 Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995, 1998) and Webb (2001) found similar
results in different data sets that covered different time periods.
Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994, 1996) argued, however, that 401(k)
savers would have saved more in any case. 
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Rates of Pension Coverage and Job Training: Regression Results by Industry
Dependent variables among those with a pension
Independent variables % in industry with a pension % in industry with a DB plan % in industry with a DC plan
% in industry who got job training 1.17 (0.28) 0.792 (0.192) –0.560 (0.195)
Constant –0.056 (0.122) 0.208 (0.083) 0.894 (0.085)
Adjusted R
2 0.733 0.728 0.548
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample includes seven one-digit industries (agriculture, mining/construction, manufac-
turing, retail/wholesale trade, finance/real estate/insurance/business and repair services, transportation/communication/other services,
and public administration). Training rates are from the January 1991 Current Population Survey and are weighted to make them nation-
ally representative; the national mean is 0.426 (0.002). Pension coverage rates, from the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances, are also
weighted.
Table 2explain if people are fully rational. The evidence
may be explained if people are irrationally impatient
and have trouble saving. Workers with a self-control
problem will be better off if they are compelled to
save for retirement. Pensions do this, and workers
accept them because they recognize their inability
to control their spending. 
This theoretical explanation is supported by
extensive psychological evidence and by recent
economic analysis in Laibson, Repetto, and
Tobacman (1998). These authors used simulation
models to show that people who recognize their
self-control problems will use 401(k)-like plans to
make wealth available to themselves in the future.
According to their results, 401(k) plans always raise
aggregate private saving because of their tax advan-
tages. Their additional value as a means to commit
to a long-term saving plan provides an extra boost
of 17 to 60 percent to the aggregate saving rate, if
people have self-control problems.8
Although the savings debate has focused on
401(k) plans, DB pensions also allow workers to
commit to a long-term saving plan. Indeed, earlier
evidence suggests that people with DB pensions
saved more altogether, as people with 401(k) plans
now do. Diamond and Hausman (1984) found that
the elasticity of wealth with respect to pension
income was –0.141, implying far less than a dollar-
for-dollar offset. They also found that Social Security
benefits reduced private wealth by less than dollar-
for-dollar. Dicks-Mireaux and King (1983) found
the same patterns for private and public pensions
in Canadian data. Other researchers have suggested
that workers prefer rising wage profiles, perhaps
because it helps them save (Loewenstein and
Sicherman, 1991; Frank and Hutchens, 1993).
It is important to note that 401(k) plans in par-
ticular do not entirely solve the self-control problem,
since contributions are voluntary and workers
can borrow against their 401(k) assets under some
circumstances. Other DC pension plans require
mandatory contributions.9 However, any DC pension
may be liquidated when a worker changes jobs,
subject to a 10 percent penalty before age 59 1/2.
These factors raise the risk that some workers will
underfund their retirement saving. Chang (1996)
found that 401(k) cash-out rates tend to be lower for
older workers and for workers with higher balances.
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1999) estimated that cash-
outs will reduce the aggregate value of 401(k) assets
for workers at age 65 by about 5 percent. 
Summary
The existence of pensions and other forms of
deferred compensation is puzzling. Pensions con-
strain workers to save, whether they wish to or not.
Existing pension theory suggests that the constraint
is accepted because pensions encourage long-term
employment, raising productivity and thus overall
compensation. Considerable evidence supports
this explanation for DB pensions, but the theory
fails to account for the use of portable DC pensions. 
Therefore, we have proposed a supplementary
explanation—that workers value pensions as a
vehicle for long-term saving. This explanation is
linked to recent economic research that builds on
extensive psychological evidence, and it is supported
by findings that 401(k) plans, DB pensions, and
Social Security all tend to raise personal saving.
POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE
EVOLUTION OF PENSION STRUCTURE
A number of factors, both legal and economic,
may explain the shift from DB to DC pensions. Legis-
lative changes since 1974 have expanded the flexi-
bility and preferential tax treatment of DC pensions
but, at the same time, have boosted the costs of
administering pension plans. For example, the
government has set increasingly tight standards for
maximum benefits, vesting, and eligibility in all
types of pension plans, as well as funding require-
ments in DB plans.10 Ippolito (1995) reported esti-
mates from the Hay-Huggins Company (1990) that
the average administrative costs of DB and 401(k)
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8 The range of increase depends on the particular features of the 401(k).
These figures assume a value of one for the rate of relative risk aversion,
though saving responds less to the 401(k) if risk aversion is higher. The
authors argued that the most careful set of studies support a value of
one or less.
9 In a money purchase plan, the employer’s annual contribution is
determined by a specific formula, usually either a dollar amount or a
percentage of salary. A target benefit plan is designed to provide a
specific benefit level, but the benefit is not guaranteed. In a simplified
employee pension, the employer contributes to the employee’s indi-
vidual retirement account. The employer distributes its own shares
to employees in an employee stock ownership plan, while employees
receive an option to purchase shares at a specified price in a stock
purchase plan.
10 Clark and McDermed (1990) provided a detailed explanation of these
legal changes, which began with the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA). Using data for 1980-86, Kruse (1995) found that
firms generally offered DC plans alongside existing DB plans, rather
than terminating DB plans. Using later data from 1985-92, Papke (1999)
found some replacement of both DB and other types of DC plans by
401(k) plans.
Friedberg and Owyang REVIEWplans generally rose at similar rates, although very
small DB plans grew relatively more expensive.
While legislative changes can account for some
of the shift from DB to DC pensions, they cannot
explain other patterns—for example, different rates
of diffusion of DC pensions across industries and
the movement of workers from types of firms with
relatively high rates of DB coverage to types with
high rates of DC coverage. A series of papers by Clark
and McDermed (1990), Gustman and Steinmeier
(1992), Ippolito (1995), and Kruse (1995) showed
(i) that DB pensions remain more prevalent in large
firms, industries such as manufacturing, and union-
ized jobs but (ii) that the proportion of workers in
such jobs has declined.
Therefore, we are seeking explanations based
on the economic theory of pensions outlined pre-
viously. DB pensions lose their appeal when the
value of long-term employment declines. As with
other recent labor market trends, such a change
may be rooted in the diffusion of information
technologies over the last 20-odd years.11 Techno-
logical change is a leading explanation for the grow-
ing demand for skilled workers and consequent
rise in earnings inequality between skilled and
unskilled workers. It would not be surprising if
rapid shifts in skill requirements associated with
new technologies have also reduced the value of
long-term employment.
In Friedberg and Owyang (2001) we explore
this idea. An increasing pace of skill-biased techno-
logical change tends to raise the volatility of demand
for particular skills. This change will in turn lower
the expected duration of employment, and both
workers and employers will gain less from the use
of DB pensions.
In addition, factors such as technological change
that have reduced relative earnings of unskilled
workers may also explain their loss of pension
coverage. Figure 1 shows the declining rate of pen-
sion coverage for all workers; Bloom and Freeman
(1992) and Even and MacPherson (2000) have shown
that coverage fell substantially more for workers
with less education. Thus, it will be important to
explore how changes in technology have affected
both the level and structure of pension coverage.
OTHER IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
EVOLUTION OF PENSION STRUCTURE
Other differences between DB and DC pensions,
besides those involving portability, are summarized
in Table 1. Firms manage DB pension assets and
as a consequence bear most of the resulting risks,
except the risk of early severance. In contrast,
workers manage DC pension assets and bear most
of the risks. These differences could have important
effects not only on job mobility, but also on con-
sumption and saving before and after retirement
and on stock market participation.
Additional Differences Between
Pensions During Employment
Many aspects of administrative control and
consequent risk are borne by firms when pensions
are DB and are borne by workers when pensions
are DC. Firms control how DB pension assets are
invested and consequently bear the risk of uncertain
interest rates, which may leave pensions under-
funded or overfunded. Government regulations
instituted since 1974 tightly restrict funding of DB
pension obligations, however, and thus reduce the
extent to which firms can smooth these risks over
time. 
Workers control how DC pension assets are
invested among several options—generally mutual
funds and company stock—which employers choose
to offer. Consequently, workers bear the risk of
uncertain rates of return. Underfunding is a greater
possibility, as some employers allow workers to
borrow against DC pensions in case of financial need.
Lastly, firms bear all the administrative and
regulatory costs of DB pensions but also bear much
of the costs of DC pensions. Workers incur costs to




The primary difference post-employment is
that DB pension benefits are paid out as an annuity,
while DC pension assets are transferred as a lump
sum to workers. Consequently, firms bear the risk
of the uncertain lifespan of workers who receive
DB pensions, while workers bear this risk when they
receive DC pensions.
Post-employment, the administrative control
and consequent interest rate risk of each pension
type generally remain the same as during employ-
ment. However, the burden of administrative and
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11 For example, the personal computer was launched by IBM in 1981.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS Friedberg and Owyangregulatory costs of DC pensions shift from firms to
workers upon retirement. 
Implications for Consumption and
Saving
Consumption and saving patterns are likely to
differ for workers with different types of pensions.
Workers with DC pensions bear interest rate and
lifespan risk, and because individuals are risk-averse,
this should induce additional precautionary saving.
Similarly, they should be slower to deplete their
wealth after retirement. All that, however, depends
on individuals making consumption and saving
choices rationally. Self-control problems of the type
described earlier may be abetted by the lump-sum
payout at separation from DC pensions. In order to
encourage the preservation of DC pension assets,
withdrawals before age 59 1/2 suffer a 10 percent
penalty, as we noted earlier.
Implications for Public Policy
Because DC pensions are paid as a lump sum,
elderly with DC pensions are more likely to outlive
their assets, compared with elderly with DB pen-
sions. This will be exacerbated if self-control prob-
lems lead to overconsumption after receiving the
lump sum. As a result, the spread of DC pensions
may increase take-up of means-tested public pro-
grams like Supplemental Security Income (which
offers cash benefits), Medicaid (which pays for long-
term care), and food stamps.
Medicaid rules dealing with annuitized versus
unannuitized wealth may further encourage retirees
with DC pensions to spend down their assets.12
Medicaid only pays for long-term care when income
and assets are low enough. Both must be extremely
low for single people to qualify. However, the spouse
of a married person who qualifies may retain $2,000
in monthly income, $20,000 in assets, and 50 percent
of assets between $20,000 and $180,000. Annuitized
DB pension wealth is treated as income, while un-
annuitized DC pension wealth is treated as an asset.
Since the asset limit is relatively stricter than the
income limit, DC pension wealth is subject to a
relatively high implicit tax, in case one spouse
applies to Medicaid to pay for long-term care.
Implications for Financial Markets
DC pension plans that do not involve employee
stock ownership or stock options give workers some
choices over their investment strategy. Thus, pension
structure will influence financial markets if firms
and workers make different portfolio choices. A
growing body of financial research suggests that,
even if investors are fully rational, the process by
which information diffuses affects both rates of
return and volatility in financial markets. For exam-
ple, a simple model of herding laid out in Banerjee
(1992) suggests that investors who have little or no
private information rationally follow the behavior
of others, which may be highly misleading. Learning
models can also lead to herding, as noted in Smith
and Sørensen (2000). Individual investors may be
more subject to these types of “informational cas-
cades” than institutional investors like pension
funds. Another class of models analyzes specific
deviations from rationality to which small investors
may be more prone; these may explain the equity-
premium and other long-standing puzzles involving
financial markets.13
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we have reviewed a variety of
causes and consequences of the choice of pension
structure. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
evolution of pensions over the last 20 years has
begun to influence many aspects of working and
saving. While the spread of defined benefit (DB)
pensions in the 1950s and 1960s contributed to
the decline in the average retirement age, retirement
ages have stabilized in the 1980s and 1990s as
defined contribution (DC) pensions have taken hold.
Meanwhile, workers at younger ages are changing
jobs more frequently. 
Although it is too early to tell, post-retirement
consumption patterns may also shift. If people cor-
rectly evaluate the increased risk of outliving their
DC pension resources, they may slow down their
consumption and save more. However, access to
their entire pension wealth upon retirement may
lead some to hasten consumption, ultimately wors-
ening the problems of poverty among widows and
the oldest old and increasing the fiscal drain on
income support programs for the elderly. 
As the age structure of the labor force continues
to shift, it will be important to understand the impli-
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12 Medicaid’s treatment of DB and DC pension wealth is detailed in
Webb (2001).
13 See, for example, Barberis, Huang, and Santos (1999) and Barberis
and Huang (2000). These articles analyze the financial implications
of loss aversion and mental accounting, described in Rabin and
Thaler (2001).
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cations of the ongoing changes in pensions. Future
research in this area promises new insights not only
about the role of pensions, but more broadly about
the behavior of workers and firms in an era of
changing expectations and new technologies. 
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